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Abstract
Even under antitrust enforcement, rms may still form a cartel in an innitely-
repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to one. We
present a linear oligopoly model where the prot-maximizing cartel price converges to
the competitive equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. We then identify
a set of necessary conditions for this seemingly counter-intuitive result.
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1 Introduction
It is well-known that in an innitely-repeated oligopoly model, almost all prices, including the
monopoly price, can be sustained by trigger strategy proles as cartel prices for su¢ ciently
patient rms. Since the monopoly price leads to the highest deadweight loss in social welfare,
the e¤ects of antitrust enforcement are often conned to the question whether enforcement
deters monopoly pricing, see e.g. Block et al. (1981) and Harrington (2005). Antitrust en-
forcement in practice is regarded as too weak to deter monopoly pricing. We investigate and
reexamine the latter conclusion by presenting a simple model where the prot-maximizing
cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the rms become su¢ ciently pa-
tient. Because of its important policy implications for antitrust enforcement, we investigate
conditions for such a convergence result in a general innitely-repeated oligopoly model.
The model studied here is a repeated-game version of the dynamic model in Harrington
(2004, 2005), who extensively motivates most of the assumptions adopted in our model.
In particular, nes (including other liabilities) and detection probabilities depend upon the
current and past prices, which makes Harringtons model a dynamic game. In a steady state,
however, the equilibrium analysis in any period will only depend on the cartel price in the
current period. For explanatory reasons, we assume that detection probabilities and nes
depend upon the current price only.
One crucial feature in our model is that the cartel may reestablish after it is detected and
prosecuted. Our approach unies two extreme treatments in the literature. On one extreme,
Harrington (2004, 2005) assumes that a cartel dissolves after it is caught and ned. On
other extreme, Motta and Polo (2003) investigate notorious cartels, that will reestablish no
matter how many times it has been convicted. Here we assume that a cartel will reestablish
probabilistically in every period in which it is detected and ned.
This note makes several contributions. First, the presence of probabilistic reestablishment
of the cartel requires di¤erent equilibrium conditions on sustainable cartel prices. In Section
2, we set up such a model with probabilistic reestablishment of the cartel and provide the
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corresponding equilibrium conditions. Section 3 is devoted to a linear Bertrand oligopoly
model with linear detection probabilities. The ne is proportional to the rmsillegal gains,
as suggested by the current US sentencing guidelines. We show that the prot-maximizing
cartel price converges to the competitive Bertrand equilibrium price as the discount factor
goes to one. In Section 4, we establish a set of necessary conditions for such a seemingly
counter-intuitive result in a general setup and provide intuition for this convergence.
2 The Model
Consider an innitely-repeated oligopoly model in the presence of antitrust enforcement.
In each period, rms compete in prices and the antitrust authority (AA) investigates the
market. If the rms collude, they will be caught and ned with certain probability. Both
the probability of detection and the ne depend on how serious the anti-trust violation is in
the current period.
Price competition in every period is modelled as a symmetric Bertrand game among
n  2 rms.1 Let (p1; : : : ; pn) be a rms per-period prot for prices p1; : : : ; pn 2 R+.
For convenience, let (p)  (p; : : : ; p) and opt (p)  supp0  (p0; p; : : : ; p) be a rms prot
from a unilateral deviation against the cartel price p. Denote the symmetric competitive
(Nash) equilibrium price and the maximal collusive (or monopoly) price by pN and pM ,
respectively. As in Harrington (2004, 2005), we assume that (p) is continuous and strictly
increasing in p 2 [pN ; pM) with a maximum at pM , opt (p) is continuous, strictly increasing
and opt (p) > (p) > 0 for p 2  pN ; pM. To further simplify the exposition, we normalize
the model such that (pN) = 0 and interpret  (p) as the net prot above 
 
pN

.
As motivated by Harrington (2004, 2005), the detection probability depends upon the
cartels price setting and this reects that a higher cartel price might raise more suspicions
about cartel abuse and, therefore, makes detection (and conviction) more likely. If rms
1Our analysis also applies to quantity competition oligopoly model with proper revision of detection
probability and ne functions.
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collude at price p > pN , they will be detected with probability (p) 2 [0; 1], which is
non-decreasing and di¤erentiable in p. By default, (pN) = 0. We forego imposing right-
continuity of (p) at p = pN to capture the situation of constant detection probabilities
for p > pN . As in Rey (2003), only current periods misconduct is prosecuted. If the
rms are found guilty, every rm will have to pay the one-time ne f(p)  0, which is a
non-decreasing, di¤erentiable function on p 2 (pN ; pM ] that may not be right continuous at
p = pN to capture xed nes for p > pN . In order to avoid triviality of the model, we also
assume that F (p)   (p) f(p) <  (p) for all p > pN . Note that 0(p)  0 and f 0(p)  0
imply that F 0(p)  0. Also, 0  limp#pN F (p)  limp#pN  (p) = 0 implies F (p) must be
continuous at p = pN even though  (p) or f(p) might not be right continuous.
There are two di¤erent treatments in the literature of how rms behave after each con-
viction. In Harrington (2004, 2005), being caught once is su¢ cient to deter cartel activity
in the future. In Motta and Polo (2003), the economic sector is notorious for cartel activi-
ties despite many convictions. To unify these two di¤erent treatments, let  2 [0; 1] be the
probability that the rms stop illegal activities after each conviction.  = 0 implies that
cartel is notorious implies, while  = 1 means the sector becomes competitive after the rst
conviction of a cartel.
In the repeated game, every rm has a common discount factor  2 (0; 1) per period.
It is well-known that an innitely-repeated game, such as the model studied in this paper,
generally admits multiple equilibrium outcomes when the discount factor is su¢ ciently close
to one. We are interested in subgame perfect equilibria with the following modied trigger
strategy prole to sustain a cartel price of p > pN : Firms collude at price p > pN in the rst
period and continue to collude at price p as long as no rm deviates in setting this price.
Any price deviation by any rm leads to perpetual competition at price pN . Cartel will be
detected with probability (p), after which the rms continue to collude with probability 1 
in the following period and switch to perfect competition with probability  forever. Under
such a strategy prole, the present value of a rms expected prot V (p; ) is determined
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recursively by
V (p; ) =  (p) + [1  (p)] V (p; ) +  (p) [(1  )V (p; )  f(p)] ;
which yields
V (p; ) =
 (p)  F (p)
1   +  (p) : (1)
Assuming that any price-deviating rm will not be ned, the equilibrium condition becomes
V (p; )  opt (p).2 We assume that V (p; ) is strictly log-concave on pN ; pM, which ensures
that V (p; ) has a unique maximum on

pN ; pM

that is a continuous function of  2 (0; 1)
and other parameters. The prot-maximizing cartel price is then
pC() 2 argmax
p
V (p; ) subject to V (p; )  opt (p) : (2)
3 A Linear Bertrand Model
In this section, we show that the prot-maximizing cartel price can converge to the compet-
itive equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. Consider a homogeneous Bertrand
oligopoly model with linear demand 2  p and constant marginal costs of 0. Then, we have
 (p) =
1
n
p (2  p) , pN = 0, pM = 1, and opt (p) = p (2  p) for all p 2 (pN ; pM ]:
The antitrust regulation is given by  (p) = p with  > 0, and f (p) = k (p), where the
ne function reects the current practice in the US (see Harrington 2004, 2005). Note that
0  F (p) <  (p) for all p 2 (0; 1] if 0  k < 1. Recall that p can be sustained as a cartel
price by our modied grim trigger strategy prole if and only if V (p; )  opt (p), which
holds as long as [ (k + n)] p < 1. Note that this condition is independent of the discount
factor . This condition ensures that any p that is su¢ ciently close to the competitive price
pN = 0 can be sustained as a cartel price for su¢ ciently large discount factors. This fact
conrms the assertion of Harrington (2004, 2005) that the equilibrium conditions are always
non-binding for su¢ ciently large  < 1.
2Our analysis is still valid if a price-deviating rm is ned when the cartel is detected.
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With our modied trigger strategy prole, a rms value function is given by
V (p; ) =
1
n
(1  kp) (2  p) p
1   + p : (3)
Observe that V (p; ) is log concave in p 2 (0; 1] because
@2 lnV (p; )
@p2
=   (k)
2
(1  kp)2  
1
(2  p)2  
1
p2
+
()2
(1   + p)2 
@2 lnV (p; 1)
@p2
< 0:
Because any price that is su¢ ciently close to the competitive price can be supported as a
cartel price, and as we will show, the prot-maximizing cartel price converges to the compet-
itive price, the constraint in (2) becomes nonbinding for su¢ ciently large . Consequently,
for su¢ ciently large , pC() is characterized by @V (p; ) =@p = 0, that is,
(2  2p  4kp+ 3kp2)(1   + p)  (2p  p2   2kp2 + kp3) = 0: (4)
Denote lim!1 pC () = p^. Taking the limit of (4) as  ! 1, and given  > 0, we have
2kp^3   p^2   2kp^2 = 0) p^ = 0 and p^ = 1 + 1
2k
> 1:
Obviously, p^ = 1 + 1
2k
> pM cannot be the limit of prot-maximizing cartel price. Hence,
lim!1 pC () = 0 = pN , which is the main message of this paper.
To conclude this section, we demonstrate that the prot-maximizing cartel price pC ()
is nonmonotonic in . When the equilibrium condition in (2) is binding, pC() is the largest
price p 2 [0; 1] satisfying V (p; )  opt (p):
max p2[0;1] p, s.t.
1  kp
n (1   + p)  1 ) p
C() = min

1  n(1  )
n + k
; 1

;
which monotonically nondecreases in the discount factor  2 (0; 1). When the equilibrium
condition in (2) is nonbinding, then pC() is the solution to (4) in [0; 1]. Generally speaking,
we cannot obtain the analytical solutions to (4). However, when k = 1=2, (4) simplies to
(2  p)  p2   3
2
(1  ) p+ 5 (1  ) = 0
) pC() =
q
9
4
(1  )2 + 20 (1  )  3
2
(1  )
2
;
6
-6
1n 1n
1
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Figure 1: The prot-maximizing cartel price pC ().
which decreases in  2 (0; 1) and converges to the competitive equilibrium price pN = 0
as  goes to 1. Figure 1 illustrates that the prot-maximizing cartel price is nonmonotonic
with respect to the discount factor . When  is small enough, only the competitive price
can be the equilibrium price. On the other hand, when the discount factor  is su¢ ciently
close to 1, the equilibrium condition is nonbinding so (4) characterizes the prot-maximizing
cartel price (which decreases in ). For an intermediate range of discount factors, the prot-
maximizing cartel price is determined by the equilibrium condition, and increases in . It is
worthwhile to note that as the discount factor increases, the set of equilibrium prices grows,
yet the prot-maximizing cartel price decreases to the competitive price eventually.
4 Conditions for Convergence
To establish our convergence result, we rst need to make sure whether all p that are suf-
ciently close to the competitive price can be supported by the modied trigger strategy
proles described in Section 2 for su¢ ciently large  2 (0; 1).
Proposition 1 If there exists " > 0 such that
(p) >  (p)

f (p) + opt (p)

for all p 2  pN ; pN + " ; (5)
then any p 2 [pN ; pN + ") can be sustained in equilibrium for all  2 [0; 1) for some 0 < 1.
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Proof. Observe that p = pN can always be sustained in equilibrium for all  2 (0; 1).
(5) implies that for all p 2 (pN ; pN + "), (p)   F (p) >  (p)opt (p). Because V (p; ) is
continuous in , there exists some 0 < 1 such that for all  2 [0; 1),
V (p; ) =
(p)  F (p)
1   + (p)  
opt (p) ;
which means that p 2 [pN ; pN + ") can be sustained in equilibrium for all  2 [0; 1).
Note that  (p) f (p) <  (p) implies (5) for notorious cartels, i.e.  = 0. For other ,
such as  = 1, the more restrictive (5) is needed to guarantee sustainable cartel prices above
pN . It is straightforward to verify that the linear model presented in Section 2 satises (5).
Proposition 1 asserts that the equilibrium condition will not be binding for su¢ ciently
large  2 (0; 1) whenever pC () converges to pN as  goes to one. Consequently, pC ()
maximizes V (p; ) for su¢ ciently large  2 (0; 1). The next proposition provides necessary
conditions for such convergence:
Proposition 2 Under (5) and 0 (p) > 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pN + "),
if lim
!1
pC () = pN , then either 0(pN) = lim
p#pN
F 0(p) or lim
p#pN
(p) = 0: (6)
Proof. If lim!1 pC () = pN , then Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium condition
in (2) is not binding when  is su¢ ciently close to 1. Consequently, there exists a 00 2 [0; 1)
such that for all  2 [00; 1), we have V 0(pC ()) = 0, or
 
1   + (pC ()) 0(pC ())  F 0(pC ()) =  (pC ())  F (pC ()) 0(pC ()); (7)
where the rst term on the left-hand side and the last two terms on the right-hand side
are positive. If 0(pC ()) = 0, then (7) reduces to 0(pC ()) = F 0(pC ()), which implies
that pC () is independent of  2 [00; 1). So for lim!1 pC () = pN , it is necessary that
pC () = pN for all  2 [00; 1), i.e. 0(pN) = limp#pN F 0(p). Otherwise, i.e. 0(pC ()) > 0,
by limp#pN [(p)  F (p)] = 0, taking the limit of (7) as  ! 1 yields
  lim
!1
(pC ())  lim
!1

0(pC ())  F 0(pC ()) = 0
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which implies that either 0(pN) = limp#pN F 0(p) or lim!1 (pC ()) = 0.
In case either  = 0 or 0 (p) = 0 for all p 2 (pN ; pN + "), only the rst condition
under (6) is necessary for convergence. This condition implies that penalties F (p) such
that limp#pN F 0(p) = 0(pN) lead to the competitive outcome independent of  2 [0; 1] and
0(). If the rst condition fails, convergence is impossible for notorious cartels ( = 0) or
detection probabilities that are constant. For less notorious cartels ( > 0) under increasing
detection probabilities (0 (p) > 0), convergence to the competitive outcome requires the
second condition limp#pN (p) = 0, as in the linear model. We interpret limp#pN (p) = 0 as
putting relatively less e¤ort on prosecuting mild abuses just above the competitive equilib-
rium price, and 0 (p) > 0 as monitoring price uctuations. So, such antitrust enforcement
can be e¤ective in reducing the cartel price to the competitive equilibrium price.
References
[1] Block, M., F. Nold, and J. Sidak (1981). The Deterrent E¤ect of Antitrust Enforcement.
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 429-445.
[2] Harrington, J. (2004). Cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority.
The Rand Journal of Economics 35, 651-673.
[3] Harrington, J. (2005). Optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority.
International Economic Review 46, 145-170.
[4] Motta, M. and M. Polo (2003). Leniency programs and cartel prosecution. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 21, 347-379
[5] Rey, P. (2003). Towards a theory of competition policy. In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen,
and S. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and
Applications. Cambridge University Press.
9
